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‘Orphaned’ Transplantable Organs: 
Law, Ethics, and Ownership
Remigius N Nwabueze*
Th e legal status of an organ, in the period between its extraction from the body of a 
donor and its implantation in the body of a recipient, is unclear. In that period, the 
excised organ might be said to be orphaned because of its ambiguous custodial and 
proprietary status, and a host of activities might take place which could jeopardise its 
safety or viability for transplantation. For instance, what happens if the organ was 
lost or damaged in transit? Not inconceivably, a thief might snatch the organ from 
the possession of the transplant team; a transplant surgeon could use the organ for the 
treatment of their relative or close friend, a celebrity, or an infl uential political fi gure, 
instead of transplanting the organ into the properly selected and designated recipient 
contrary to the established allocation criteria. Th e excised organ might be damaged 
maliciously by a third party, say, an enemy of the proposed recipient who was bent on 
frustrating the recipient’s only means of receiving a life-saving treatment. Further, 
a live donor might change their mind on donation to the potential recipient after the 
organ has already been extracted.
While these scenarios raise an interesting mix of legal, ethical, political and social 
questions, a fundamental enquiry that permeates the whole gamut of issues engendered 
by the hypothetical above is the question of ownership and proprietary entitlement 
to an excised (orphaned) organ. Accordingly, this article interrogates the question of 
proprietary control or ownership of an orphaned organ.
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The legal status of an organ, 1 in the period between its extraction from the body of a donor and its implantation in the body of a recipient, 
is unclear. 2 In that period, the excised organ might be said to be orphaned 
because of its ambiguous custodial and proprietary status. Recently, 
Kowal deployed a similar conceptualisation to capture the ethical 
ambiguity shrouding the problematic use of indigenous Australian DNA 
samples collected many decades ago for medical and scientifi c research, 
which are now stored away in institutional freezers around Australia.3 She 
1. An organ is defi ned as a “diff erentiated and vital part of the human body, 
formed by diff erent issues, that maintains its structure, vascularisation 
and capacity to develop physiological functions with an important level 
of autonomy.” Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 2: Donation 
of Solid Organs for Transplantation (UK: Department of Health, 2013) 
at Glossary, online: Human Tissue Authority <http://www.hta.gov.uk/
legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice.cfm> [HTA, Code of 
Practice 2].
2. Similarly, the Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics observed that there is 
“uncertainty around the legal status of materials that are donated for 
transplantation: for example, the status of an organ that is being treated 
prior to transplantation.” Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics, Human Bodies: 
Donation for Medicine and Research (London: Nuffi  eld Council on 
Bioethics, 2011) at para 7.21, online: Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics 
<http://www.nuffi  eldbioethics.org/project/donation>.
3. Emma Kowal, “Orphan DNA: Indigenous Samples, Ethical Biovalue and 
Postcolonial Science” (2013) 43:4 Social Studies of Science 577.
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considers such DNA samples to be orphaned because of their separation 
from the underlying aff ective networks, in that both the sources and the 
scientifi c collectors or guardians of the samples are no longer traceable.4 
However, analytical commentaries on the question of orphaned organs 
are generally few and far between. Yet, in the context of donation and 
transplantation of organs, the resolution of a signifi cant range of legal 
liability issues depends on the appropriate legal characterisation of an 
orphaned organ. 
In that penumbral period within which an organ is orphaned, a host 
of activities might take place which could jeopardise the safety or viability 
of the organ for transplantation. Pertinently, the Nuffi  eld Council on 
Bioethics has drawn attention to the increasingly complex transactions 
and multiple intermediaries involved in the process of organ donation 
and transplantation,5 which not only highlights the central role played in 
the process by organisations and organisational structures, but also points 
to “the added complexities in the form of … liabilities and obligations that 
may arise where donated material is transformed, banked or otherwise 
handled as a commodity by successive intermediaries.”6 For instance, the 
prevailing organ allocation criteria and donor-recipient matching result 
in a particular case might warrant the transportation of an excised organ 
across local, regional, state or national boundaries. But what happens 
if the organ was lost or damaged in transit? Not inconceivably, a thief 
might snatch the organ from the possession of the transplant team; a 
transplant surgeon could use the organ for the treatment of their relative 
4. Ibid at 589.
5. Similar complexities and transactional variability are also evident in the 
biobanking arena and use of excised body parts for research. See Bronwyn 
Parry, “Entangled Exchange: Reconceptualising the Characterisation and 
Practice of Bodily Commodifi cation” (2008) 39:3 Geoforum 1133. See 
also Nils Hoppe, Bioequity – Property and the Human Body (Farnham: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2009) at 25-26.
6. Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics, supra note 2 at para 1.31.
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or close friend, 7 a celebrity,8 or an infl uential political fi gure,9 instead 
of transplanting the organ into the properly selected and designated 
recipient contrary to the established allocation criteria. It might also be 
the case that the excised organ was maliciously damaged by a third party,10 
say, an enemy of the proposed recipient who was bent on frustrating the 
recipient’s only means of receiving a life-saving treatment. Further, and 
quite imaginatively, a live donor might change their mind on donation to 
the potential recipient after the organ has already been extracted.11 
While these scenarios raise an interesting mix of legal, ethical, 
political and social questions, which are often quite diffi  cult to segregate, 12 
7. While Norrie suggested that such a surgeon could be held liable ‘“for 
abuse of his position,” he did not specify the cause of action or the basis 
for such a legal liability. Kenneth M Norrie, “Human Tissue Transplants: 
Legal Liability in Diff erent Jurisdictions” (1985) 34:3 ICLQ 442 at 467.
8. Consider the controversy surrounding the liver transplant received by 
the legendary American baseball star, Mickey Mantle, who stayed on the 
waiting list for only two days. Peter Gorner & Peter Baniak, “Mantle’s 
New Liver: A Question of Ethics: Experts Find No Favoritism After 
Speedy Transplant”, Chicago Tribune (9 June 1995) 3N.
9. Also, consider the controversy surrounding the heart-liver transplant to 
Governor Casey of Pennsylvania in 1993 – he received his transplant 
after waiting for only twenty-four hours on the list. Claudia Coates, 
“Casey’s Quick Transplant Renews Ethics Debate: Medicine: Pennsylvania 
governor got heart and liver within 24 hours of getting on list, under 
guidelines giving priority to those who need multiple organs”, Los Angeles 
Times (25 July 1993). See generally Phyllis Coleman, “‘Brother, Can You 
Spare A Liver?’ Five Ways To Increase Organ Donation” (1996) 31:1 Val 
U L Rev 1.
10. Th is compares to the US case of US v Arora, 806 F Supp 1091 (Md Dist 
Ct 1994), where a scientist employed by the US government destroyed 
human cells cultured by his colleague as an acute expression of the 
animosity existing between the two. Th e US government succeeded in a 
conversion action against the wrongdoer.
11. Th is might be well taken care of by an excellent informed consent 
procedure, in which the donor is informed, and agrees, that they can no 
longer change their mind after a particular point had been reached in the 
procedure; this point might be defi ned diff erently by others and could 
be fi xed, for instance, at the point of extraction from the donor, at the 
commencement of the recipient’s surgical procedure, or after implantation 
in the recipient.
12. Childress observed that “[o]rgan allocation policy involves a mixture of 
ethical, scientifi c, medical, legal, and political factors, among others.” 
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a fundamental enquiry that permeates the whole gamut of issues 
engendered by the hypothetical above is the question of ownership and 
proprietary entitlement to an excised (orphaned) organ. Put diff erently, 
who owns or should exercise proprietary control over an orphaned 
organ? Interestingly, Nelson observed that the “question of how viable 
human organs ought to be categorized remains tricky,” mainly because 
“organs aren’t fully property, as they cannot be sold. Nor are they fully 
public goods, as society may not use them at will.” 13 Similarly, Childress 
observed that it “took me some time to discern that our debates about 
‘equitable access’ and ‘equitable allocation’ were, in part, debates about 
who ‘owns’ donated organs.”14 In the same vein, Cronin and Price, after 
suggesting that the debate on directed and conditional organ donation 
could be resolved on the basis of donor ownership or control, observed 
that the question of ownership was “no longer an issue that can be skirted 
around.” 15 However, the paucity of judicial and academic commentaries 
on that question belies the increasing recognition of its criticality in 
potentially resolving the conundrum highlighted in the hypothetical 
above. 
It might be, as Cronin and Douglas have suggested, that the 
“complexities of transplantation appear to have discouraged litigation. 
Few, if any, judicial rulings or comments exist,” meaning that the “law 
of organ donation is rather unsatisfactory.”16 As if in anticipation of this 
problem, Lord Justice Rose observed, in R v Kelly, 17 that an excised organ 
that has a use or signifi cance beyond its mere existence, such as where it 
is “intended for use in an organ transplant operation,” might be regarded 
James F Childress, “Putting Patients First in Organ Allocation: An 
Ethical Analysis of the U.S. Debate” (2001) 10:4 Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 365 at 365.
13. James L Nelson, “Trusts and Transplants” (2005) 5:4 American Journal of 
Bioethics 26 at 27.
14. Childress, supra note 12 at 366.
15. Antonia J Cronin & David Price, “Directed Organ Donation: Is the 
Donor the Owner?” (2008) 3:3 Clinical Ethics 127 at 130.
16. Antonia J Cronin & James F Douglas, “Non-Standard Kidneys For 
Transplants: Clinical Margins, Medical Morality, and the Law” (2013) 
21:3 Med L Rev 448 at 458.
17. [1999] QB 621 (CA).
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as property.18 Unfortunately, the facts in R v Kelly did not require Rose LJ 
to resolve the question of title to an excised organ, as it was suffi  cient for 
that case to hold that the scientifi cally preserved anatomical specimens 
belonged to the Royal College of Surgeons, through the work or skill 
exception, 19 and, therefore, those specimens were capable of being stolen 
under the Th eft Act. 
Accordingly, this article interrogates the question of proprietary 
control or ownership of an orphaned organ: does it belong to the 
donor, the donee, the state or community, or the potential recipient? 
Also, what are the justifi cations for the proprietary control exercised 
by the owner of an orphaned organ? In that sense, the concern here is 
not about devising an eff ective framework for increasing the supply of 
transplantable organs,20 nor is it generally about negligent liability arising 
from the transfer of defective organs or performance of a transplantation 
procedure.21 It should also be stated that the focus is on the law of 
England and Wales, though relevant comparisons have been made to 
comparable jurisdictions.
II.  Donor’s Proprietary Entitlement
Is an orphaned organ the property of the donor? If it is, the donor 
should retain certain rights over the organ and, in addition, be subject 
to certain liabilities in relation to the organ. Th e following analysis 
requires a distinction between living and cadaveric donors since diff erent 
considerations apply to each category.
18. Ibid at 631.
19. Th e origin of the exception is the Australian High Court case of 
Doodeward v Spence, (1908), 6 CLR 406 (HCA) [Doodeward] 
(establishing ownership of a cadaver or a part of cadaver through 
transformative work on it).
20. However, for a regulated market framework for increasing organ supply, 
see James S Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body 
Parts are Morally Imperative (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2005); for 
retaining the current altruistic approach, see Debra Satz, Why Some Th ings 
Should Not Be For Sale: Th e Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); for a hybrid of altruism and limited market, see 
Michele Godwin, Black Markets: Th e Supply and Demand of Body Parts 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
21. Norrie provides a good analysis of that aspect. See Norrie, supra note 7.
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A.  Cadaveric Donor’s Entitlement
Analysis of the cadaveric donor’s proprietary entitlement should begin 
with the Human Tissue Act 2004 22 which regulates cadaveric organ 
donation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland; the Act established the 
Human Tissue Authority as the regulatory body. In Scotland, however, 
cadaveric donation is regulated by the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 
2006,23 and the Human Tissue Authority established under the 2004 Act 
helps to administer the 2006 Act. 24 Both statutes contain fairly similar 
provisions, with the diff erence that while the 2004 Act uses the language 
of consent as its overall and fundamental regulatory principle, the 2006 
Act uses the language of authorisation for cadaveric donation. Th e focus 
here is on the 2004 Act. 
Th e 2004 Act is a product of scandal relating to the unauthorised 
removal, use and storage of cadaveric paediatric tissues and body parts in 
England,25 prompting Mason and Laurie to say that it was “born under 
the wrong star.”26 A brief overview of the scandal is necessary, not only 
to unpack the moral, ethical and legal underpinnings of the 2004 Act, 
but also to illuminate the proprietary analysis undergirded by the 2004 
Act. It all started with a public inquiry, chaired by Sir Ian Kennedy, into 
children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infi rmary.27 In the course 
of that inquiry, Professor RH Anderson, a professor of Morphology at 
the Hospital for Sick Children, London (Great Ormond St Hospital), 
22. (UK), c 30 [2004 Act].
23. (UK), Asp 4.
24. See JK Mason & GT Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law & Medical 
Ethics, 9th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 581.
25. For a discussion of the scandal and the litigation that followed it (AB 
v Leeds Hospital NHS, [2004] EWHC 644 (QB)), see Remigius N 
Nwabueze, “Interference with Dead Bodies and Body Parts: A Separate 
Cause of Action in Tort?” (2007) 15 Tort Law Review 63.
26. Mason & Laurie, supra note 24 at 581.
27. Bristol Royal Infi rmary Inquiry, Th e Report of the Public Inquiry into 
Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infi rmary 1984-1995: Learning 
from Bristol (London: Stationery Offi  ce, 2001); see also the Interim 
Report published by the inquiry: Bristol Royal Infi rmary Inquiry, Interim 
Report - Removal and Retention of Human Material (London: Stationery 
Offi  ce, 2000).
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testifi ed and commented on the benefi ts of heart collections for research 
and study. He particularly commended the excellent collection of hearts 
at the Royal Liverpool Children’s NHS Trust in Alder Hey hospital; this 
triggered another inquiry into the removal, use and storage of cadaveric 
organs at Alder Hey, chaired by Michael Redfern, QC.28 Th e Redfern 
inquiry heard evidence relating to the emotional distress suff ered by 
the parents of the deceased children when they learned that some parts 
of their children’s bodies were removed, used or retained without their 
consent. For instance, one of the parents testifi ed that “[i]t feels like body 
snatching. Th e hospital stole something from me. Th ey have taken us 
back 11 years in our healing process.”29 Other parents expressed similar 
anguish: “[t]hey gave me skin and bone back”; “Alder Hey stole 90% of 
my child”; “I feel devastated. I am wondering how much of her body was 
left”; and “I have learnt to live with my daughter’s death and now I have 
found out that they removed her heart. It is like losing her all over again.”30 
However, other parents were not as much opposed to the removal and 
use of their deceased children’s tissues as they were opposed to the failure 
of the hospital authorities to study those tissues. For instance, a parent 
lamented: “[s]tudying her brain would help explain why her brain did 
not form properly and it might help treat the next child born with a 
similar condition. Unfortunately her brain has not been studied. Instead 
it sits in a jar in a storeroom somewhere.”31 In short, the Redfern Report 
catalogued a series of deception on the part of the medical authorities, in 
part engendered by the lack of transparency and insuffi  cient disclosure 
procedures adopted for post-mortem examinations carried out on the 
deceased children.32 As a result, there was signifi cant public distrust of 
the medical system and healthcare professionals. 33
Importantly, the Redfern inquiry observed that the practice of 
28. Th e House of Commons, Th e Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry (London: 
Stationery Offi  ce, 2001).
29. Ibid at 19.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid at 22-23.
33. Margaret Brazier, “Retained Organs: Ethics and Humanity” (2002) 22:4 
LS 550 at 556.
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unauthorised removal, use or retention of cadaveric tissues was facilitated 
by the ambiguous provisions of the Human Tissue Act 1961.34 Th e 1961 
Act, which was then the relevant legislation, enabled a hospital in lawful 
possession of a dead body to remove its tissues or organs for research or 
transplantation, even when it was not known to the hospital that the 
deceased or their family objected to the removal, use or storage of the 
body part. Th us, under the 1961 Act, it was not clear whether the hospital 
should be proactive and seek or obtain the consent of the deceased’s 
families, where the deceased did not express wishes in that regard prior 
to their deaths, or whether it was the burden of the deceased’s families to 
make conscious eff orts to register their objection to cadaveric donation. 
Among other things, therefore, the Redfern inquiry recommended the 
repeal of the Human Tissue Act 1961, and the promulgation of new 
legislation that would make explicit consent the cornerstone requirement 
for the removal, use and storage of cadaveric tissues and body parts. Th e 
government accepted this recommendation, and accordingly the 2004 
Act was enacted. It contains seven scheduled purposes, including organ 
donation and transplantation, which can only be performed with the 
prior consent of a specifi ed person.35 Th us, consent is the conceptual 
framework upon which the superstructure of the 2004 Act rests.
Under the 2004 Act, an organ might be retrieved from the body of a 
deceased person in two situations.36 First, where the deceased consented 
to donation during his or her lifetime, the organ could be lawfully 
removed by the transplant team without reference to the deceased’s 
family.37 In practice, however, organ retrieval authorities endeavour to 
inform the family of the deceased about the donation, and are unlikely to 
34. (UK), c 54.
35. 2004 Act, supra note 22, s 1.
36. Note that the Human Tissue Act 2004 does not govern coronial activities. 
In circumstances where coronial jurisdiction is triggered, such as the 
sudden and unexplained death of a person, the Coroner is entitled to the 
lawful possession or custody of the deceased for the purposes of coronial 
inquiry, and might therefore order the anatomical examination of the 
deceased and authorise the removal of any organ of the deceased that 
bears on the cause of death. See generally John Jervis et al, Jervis on the 
Offi  ce and Duties of Coroners, 12th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002).
37. HTA, Code of Practice 2, supra note 1 at para 95.
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proceed with the donation against the family’s objection.38 Second, where 
the deceased’s prior wishes about donation are not known, their family 
might be contacted with a view to ascertaining what the deceased’s wishes 
were, or might have been, 39 and if positive, the family would be asked to 
consent to donation.40 Th us, going by the history and express provisions 
of the 2004 Act, it is clear that a deceased donor is empowered to exercise 
signifi cant control and decisional authority over the use of their organs.41 
Control power of this sort over one’s organs qualifi es as a proprietary 
interest. Interestingly, this sort of psychological aspect of property has 
been highlighted by the Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics, by observing that 
the concept of ownership can be “used with a broader moral resonance,” 
in the sense that “when people talk about ‘owning’ their bodies or body 
parts, even if they use the language of property, their primary concern is 
with control over those materials.”42 
A control-based property right, that is, “a person’s position as the 
primary arbiter over what is to be done with a thing,” 43 acutely expresses 
the title holder’s personhood and promotes their autonomy.44 Th e ability 
to isolate and particularise the control elements of property, as analysed 
38. Ibid at para 99. See also Sonya Norris, Organ Donation and 
Transplantation in Canada (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2009) at 14, 
online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/
researchpublications/prb0824-e.htm>.
39. For a detailed discussion of the family’s fallibility in predicting the 
deceased’s wishes regarding donation, as well as the role of families in 
cadaveric organ donation, see TM Wilkinson, Ethics and the Acquisition of 
Organs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 64-79.
40. HTA, Code of Practice 2, supra note 1 at paras 98, 100.
41. But this power could be signifi cantly undermined by the family’s 
(practical) power of veto, which, as Wilkinson observed, might confl ict 
with the deceased’s posthumous personal sovereignty. See Wilkinson, 
supra note 39 at 76-79.
42. Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics, supra note 2 at para 5.18 [emphasis in the 
original].
43. John Christman, “Distributive Justice and the Complex Structure 
of Ownership” (1994) 23:3 Philosophy & Public Aff airs 225 at 231 
[Christman, “Distributive Justice”].
44. Margaret J Radin, “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957. 
For an interesting criticism of Radin, see Neil Duxbury, “Do Markets 
Degrade?” (1996) 59:3 Mod L Rev 331.
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above, has been facilitated by the bundle of rights theory’s disaggregation 
of property. 45 For instance, the bundle of rights theory projects property 
as an indefi nite bundle of sticks, in which each stick represents a separate 
and protectable proprietary interest.46 Th e greatest accumulation of such 
sticks, qualitatively and quantitatively, amounts to ownership.47 However, 
Christman has argued that full ownership, in the sense of comprising all 
the sticks in the bundle, is neither possible nor justifi able on the basis 
of the Lockean natural rights theory of property, because Locke’s theory 
embeds positive duties to others, entailing equal rights to the share of 
resources, which countervails the idea of full ownership.48 For this reason, 
Christman has suggested that there is no unifi ed or monolithic concept 
of ownership; rather, ownership is comprised of two congeries (or a 
bipartite package) of sticks in the bundle of rights concept of property,49 
and thus, there is “no conceptual reason to understand ownership only 
as the full set of liberal rights.”50 Nevertheless, a single stick or lesser 
collection of sticks not approximating to ownership is still protectable 
as a proprietary interest,51 even when not coextensive with the stick of 
alienation. 
45. Grey provides an excellent analysis of the fragmentation of property. TC 
Grey, “Th e Disintegration of Property” in JR Pennock & JW Chapman, 
eds, Property, Nomos 22 (New York: New York University Press, 1980) at 
69-85.
46. SR Munzer, A Th eory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) at 23 (however, Christman disagreed with this view, arguing 
that property is better normatively seen as a collection of rights that fall 
into two categories of control and income rights). Christman, “Distributive 
Justice”, supra note 43 (thus, Christman suggested that a single stick in 
the bundle of property rights, considered individually and in isolation 
from the bipartite groups of property rights, does not carry much 
normative importance).
47. GP Wilson, “Jurisprudence and the Discussion of Ownership” (1957) 
15:2 Cambridge LJ 216 at 222. 
48. John Christman, “Can Ownership Be Justifi ed By Natural Rights?” 
(1986) 15:2 Philosophy & Public Aff airs 156.
49. John Christman, “Self-Ownership, Equality, and the Structure of Property 
Rights” (1991) 19:1 Political Th eory 28 at 37.
50. Christman, “Distributive Justice”, supra note 43 at 229 [emphasis in 
original].
51. Grey in Pennock & Chapman, supra note 45.
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Th e bundle of rights theory of property is exemplifi ed by Honoré’s 
classic work on ownership, 52 in which he listed eleven standard incidents 
of ownership, all or congeries of which might be recognised by a mature 
legal system as constituting ownership.53 More interestingly, Honoré’s 
list serves to highlight some of the individual sticks in a bundle of 
property rights; these include an owner’s management right – that is, 
the right to control the use of a particular resource. Apparently, this 
right is coextensive with the statutory requirement for inter vivos consent 
to cadaveric donation under the 2004 Act. Put diff erently, by making 
lawful cadaveric donation dependent on the inter vivos or pre-mortem 
consent of a donor, the 2004 Act has imbued donors with (control-
based) proprietary interests in their excised organs. Envisioning a similar 
analytical strategy for the US, Robertson observed that there were no 
third party rights to a donated cadaveric organ that could supersede the 
wishes of the donor because “the donor’s autonomy is fundamental, 
and … the organs are hers until she donates them.”54 As could be 
surmised from the above quotation, the only question that remains to be 
considered is when the donor’s proprietary interest could be understood 
as exhausted or transferred to a potential recipient: is it at the point of 
extraction of the organ, or at any point up to implantation into the body 
of the recipient? Th is question requires an interrogation of the law of 
gifts, which, for completeness, is fully examined below in connection 
52. Wall argued that Honoré’s framework is incomplete unless coupled with 
trespassory rules, especially the trespassory rules developed by Guido 
Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85:6 Harv L Rev 1089; 
Jesse Wall, “Th e Legal Status of Body Parts: A Framework” (2011) 31:4 
Oxford J Legal Stud 783. For a criticism of Wall, arguing that trespassory 
rules are remedial or compensatory, rather than normative, see Remigius 
N Nwabueze, “Body Parts in Property Th eory: An Integrated Framework” 
(2014) 40:1 Journal of Medical Ethics 33. Nwabueze’s view also resonates 
with Getzler’s. Joshua Getzler, “Th eories of Property and Economic 
Development” (1996) 26:4 Journal of Interdisciplinary History 639 at 
660.
53. AM Honoré, “Ownership” in AG Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) 107.
54. Christopher Robertson, “Who Is Really Hurt Anyway? Th e Problem of 
Soliciting Designated Organ Donations” (2005) 5:4 American Journal of 
Bioethics 16 at 17.
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with living donations. It suffi  ces to say that signifi cant policy and 
pragmatic considerations would infuse any answer to the question above. 
Meanwhile, and consistent with the analysis below on the delivery of 
gifts, it is suggested that a cadaveric donor’s gift is eff ective to transfer a 
proprietary interest to the recipient when the organ is retrieved from the 
donor with the intention of transplanting it to a recipient already selected 
from the waiting list, according to the prevailing allocation criteria,55 or 
to a recipient specifi ed by the donor (in systems that permit directed 
cadaveric donation). 
A view favouring the proprietary entitlement of a cadaveric donor 
is bound to impact signifi cantly on a wide-range of issues relating to 
organ donation and transplantation. For instance, consider the current 
public policy on organ procurement and allocation in England, which 
generally prohibits a directed or conditional donation of organs of 
deceased persons. 56 Such a policy would be gravely undermined by the 
recognition of the deceased donors’ proprietary interests, since it would 
enable them to determine the specifi c benefi ciary of donated organs, 
or the destination of the organs. Similarly, a proprietary interest would 
empower donors to attach certain lawful conditions to the use of their 
55. Generally, a recipient is selected from the relevant waiting list before 
a donated organ is excised from the cadaveric donor. See Institute of 
Medicine, Organ Procurement and Transplantation: Assessing Current 
Policies and the Potential Impact of the DHHS Final Rule (Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press, 1999) at 115.
56. A directed donation occurs when an organ is donated for the benefi t 
of a specifi c person. A donation is conditional when it is meant for the 
use of a class defi ned by race, religion or similar factors. Th e policy 
prohibiting directed and conditional cadaveric donation was enunciated 
following a scandalous donation of a deceased relative’s organ subject to 
the condition that it be used for Caucasians only. Department of Health, 
An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation (London: Department 
of Health, 2000); for a severely limited exception to the prohibition, see 
Department of Health, Requested Allocation of Deceased Donor Organ 
(London: UK Health Administrations, 2010). See generally Antonia 
J Cronin & James F Douglas, “Directed and Conditional Deceased 
Donor Organ Donations: Laws and Misconceptions” (2010) 18:3 Med 
L Rev 275 [Cronin & Douglas, “Directed and Conditional”]; Shaun 
D Pattinson, “Directed Donation and Ownership of Human Organs” 
(2011) 31:3 LS 392.
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donated organs.57 While no view is taken here on the propriety of such an 
outcome (as it is not the focus of this article), the point is that it would 
jeopardise the current criteria for organ donation based on altruistic and 
unconditional donation,58 and organ allocation based on clinical factors, 
such as the relative urgency of a potential recipient’s medical needs, and 
the probability of a successful transplantation outcome. Nevertheless, 
a proprietary approach in favour of the donor creates legal certainty 
and would help to resolve some of the conundrum highlighted in the 
introduction. For instance, the estate of the deceased should be able to 
sue for the loss of an orphaned organ, or damage to it. Similarly, the 
theft of an excised organ could be the subject of a criminal prosecution 
since the organ would qualify as property belonging to the deceased. In 
addition, the deceased’s estate could maintain an action in conversion 
against the unauthorised use or malicious destruction of the organ. But 
as with rights, liabilities also are bound to follow. Th us, the estate of the 
donor could (potentially) be sued for various issues in connection with 
the donation, such as the withdrawal of the organ in violation of the 
recipient’s settled expectations or reliance on the donation; the donor’s 
estate could also be sued where the organ turned out to be infectious due 
to contamination by an undisclosed disease.59
B.  Justifi cation of Cadaveric Donor’s Proprietary   
 Entitlement
While the proprietary approach above provides a neat solution and 
framework of analysis for the hypothetical in the introduction of this 
article, it still begs the question of justifi cation. In other words, why 
should the deceased donor be the owner of an orphaned organ?60 What 
57. Th is view is supported by both Cronin & Douglas, ibid; Pattinson, ibid.
58. Alasdair Maclean, “Organ Donation, Racism and the Race Relations Act” 
(1999) 149 New LJ 1250 at 1250-52.
59. Th e issue arose, but was not litigated, in Ravenis v Detroit General 
Hospital, 234 NW (2d) 411 (Mich App Ct 1975), where the defendant-
hospital transplanted to the claimants infected corneas harvested from a 
deceased donor. While the donor was not sued, the defendant was held 
liable to the claimants in negligence.
60. Nor, arguably, should the organ belong to the deceased’s family. Note that 
Wilkinson has argued persuasively that the deceased’s family interest in an 
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are the moral, ethical and legal justifi cations for vesting such proprietary 
entitlement in the deceased donor? In the wake of the Alder Hey 
and Royal Liverpool Infi rmary scandals discussed earlier, there was a 
collective sense of morality in England and Wales that the removal, use 
and storage of cadaveric organs (and other body parts) must be based on 
prior consent from the deceased, the deceased’s designated representative, 
or a family member of the deceased. Arguably, this moral consensus not 
only inspired the public policy enshrined in the 2004 Act; it also justifi es 
the recognition of a cadaveric donor’s proprietary interest. For Harris, 
however, the requirement of the deceased’s consent to donation serves no 
ethical function and misconstrues the role ordinarily played by consent in 
the context of healthcare treatment, such as the promotion of a patient’s 
agency and ability to make an informed choice. 61 In other words, consent 
safeguards a person’s right to self-determination: the right to determine 
what should be done to one’s body.62 Th us, Harris argued that, as the dead 
have no autonomy, their consent to donation was generally irrelevant,63 
implying that the recognition of a cadaveric donor’s proprietary interest 
would be ethically unjustifi able. 
However, a deceased donor’s proprietary interest in an excised organ 
could be justifi ed on the basis of posthumous autonomy. For instance, 
Wilkinson argued that the concept of personal sovereignty, the idea that 
a person should be able to run their own life, extends beyond biological 
life.64 In other words, certain interests survive death; a phenomenon 
Harris acknowledged as persisting critical interests, although he went 
ahead to argue that such interests are generally weak and must give way 
to an overriding public interest, such as the use of cadaveric organs.65 A 
set back of posthumous interests engenders harm, albeit to the person 
organ does not rest on any freestanding right of the family in relation to 
the organ (that is, in their own right), although the family could vindicate 
any distress they suff ered where retrieval was done without their consent. 
Wilkinson, supra note 39 at 66-70.
61. John Harris, “Law and Regulation of Retained Organs: Th e Ethical 
Issues” (2002) 22:4 LS 527 at 531.
62. Canterbury v Spence, 464 F (2d) 772 at 780 (DC Cir 1972).
63. Harris, supra note 61 at 534-38.
64. Wilkinson, supra note 39 at 44.
65. Harris, supra note 61 at 534-35.
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who is now dead, that is, the ante-mortem person.66 Sperling provides 
a stronger defence of posthumous interests in his suggestion that they 
should be protected as legal rights when such interests “accord with some 
signifi cant moral attributes characterizing the dead.” 67 Th us, he observed 
that although a person might be dead, they nonetheless continue to 
exist symbolically in the minds, thoughts and language of other existing 
creatures.68 Similarly, McGuinness and Brazier argued that the dead 
is not just a deceased person, but remains in our minds, as the case 
may be with our father, mother, brother, sister or friend.69 In essence, 
posthumous interests recognise “one’s symbolic existence.”70 Th ese sorts 
of interests have been recognised in the area of testamentary disposition; 
thus, a person’s interest in the distribution of their property after death is 
recognised and protected through laws and statutes on wills. For similar 
reasons, Brazier deployed this analogy, along with religious and cultural 
factors, to argue for the legal recognition of a deceased person’s burial 
wishes.71 A few cases are beginning to respond positively to posthumous 
interests by way of recognising the burial wishes of a deceased person. 72 
In Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston, one of the issues was whether 
the wishes of the deceased (a young man who committed suicide while 
in a penitentiary) regarding cremation should be recognised. Justice 
Cranston  observed that “[o]ne thing is clear, that in as much as our 
domestic law says that the views of a deceased person can be ignored it is 
66. See generally Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984); Wilkinson, supra note 39 at 34-35.
67. Daniel Sperling, Posthumous Interests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 84. For a similar 
argument, see Heather Conway, “Dead, But Not Buried: Bodies, Burial 
and Family Confl icts” (2003) 23:3 LS 423 at 433.
68. Sperling, ibid at 40-41.
69. Sheelagh McGuinness & Margaret Brazier, “Respecting the Living Means 
Respecting the Dead Too” (2008) 28:2 Oxford J Legal Stud 297.
70. Sperling, supra note 67 at 41.
71. Brazier, supra note 33 at 564-65.
72. Buchanan v Milton, [1999] 2 FLR 844 (FamD); X v Federal Republic 
of Germany, [1981] 24 DR 137; Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston, 
[2008] EWHC 1387 (QB) [Burrows]. See Remigius N Nwabueze, “Legal 
Control of Burial Rights” (2013) 2:2 Cambridge Journal of International 
Comparative Law 196.
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no longer good law.”73 Th e outcome in Burrows, which gave eff ect to the 
wish of the deceased, is arguably in dissonance with the orthodox legal 
doctrine that “[t]he dead have no rights and can suff er no wrongs.”74 
Hence, in Ibuna v Arroyo,75 Justice Smith refused to attribute interests 
or rights to a dead body “as if it has some independent right to be heard 
which is in eff ect what Cranston J is saying.”76 Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
Norrie argued that the taking of an organ from the deceased, even 
without consent or in the face of an express refusal of such consent by the 
deceased person, while morally wrong and even criminally punishable, 
could not ground the surgeon’s civil liability.77 Moreover, based on 
Getzler’s suggestion that control-based proprietary entitlements attract 
the expressive justifi catory theory of property, geared towards enhancing 
the personhood and autonomy of the entitlement holder,78 it is obvious 
that such a framework cannot avail the deceased because the dead, on the 
orthodox view, has no autonomy.
In sum, these justifi catory diffi  culties may discourage the recognition 
of a cadaveric donor’s proprietary entitlement in an excised organ. 
Consequently, the analysis turns on the proprietary entitlement of the 
live donor.
C.  Live Donor’s Entitlement
In the case of an excised organ from a live donor, awaiting transplantation 
or use, the question is whether the organ should be considered the property 
of the live donor. Of course, the Human Tissue Act 2004 regulates live 
donation, under which it is an off ence to remove an organ from a live 
donor with the intention of using it for the purposes of transplantation 
contrary to the provisions of the Act.79 An off ence would be committed 
under the Act, for example, upon giving or receiving a payment for organ 
73. Burrows, ibid at para 20. 
74. R v Ensor (1887), 3 TLR 366 at 367, Stephen J. See also, Silkwood v Kerr-
McGee Corporation, 637 F (2d) 743 (10th Cir 1980).
75. [2012] EWHC 428 (Ch).
76. Ibid at para 50.
77. Norrie, supra note 7 at 461.
78. Getzler, supra note 52.
79. 2004 Act, supra note 22, s 33.
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donation (other than for necessary expenses), or non-compliance with 
the necessary consent requirements. Live donation could be directed, 
in the case of genetic or emotional relationships, and also directed and 
altruistic, such as when the donor and recipient are brought together 
through a social networking website.80 In such cases, assessment by an 
Independent Assessor81 and consent of the Human Tissue Authority 
Transplant Approval Team are required.82 In the absence of an established 
relationship of some sort, live donation should be altruistic, non-directed 
and unconditional, in which case consent of the Human Tissue Authority 
is required – after the donation has been approved by a Panel set up for 
that purpose by the Human Tissue Authority.83 Th us, as in the case of 
a cadaveric donor above, and for the reasons stated therein, the Human 
Tissue Act 2004 has vested in live donors signifi cant control over the use 
of their excised organs, which arguably amounts to a proprietary interest.
Such control powers off er good justifi cation for vesting property 
interest in an orphaned organ in the live donor. Furthermore, on the basis 
of the work or skill exception, Cronin and Douglas suggested that organs 
donated for clinical transplantation should be viewed as the property 
of the donor because “[e]xtensive skills have been applied to them to 
make them suitable for transplantation. Th ese include not only surgical 
removal and preparation, perfusion with preserving fl uid and sterile cold 
storage, but also the establishment of recipient compatibility by means 
of tissue typing and cross-matching procedures.”84 Th e work or skill 
exception was more famously enunciated by the Australian High Court 
in Doodeward v Spence, where the claimant sued to recover possession of 
a double-headed stillborn foetus seized from him by the police. Chief 
Justice Griffi  th held that a “human body, or a portion of a human body, 
is capable by law of becoming the subject of property” when, by lawful 
exercise of work or skill, “it has acquired some attributes diff erentiating 
it from a mere corpse awaiting burial.”85 Th us, this exception anticipates 
80. HTA, Code of Practice 2, supra note 1 at para 27.
81. Ibid at paras 34, 60-64.
82. Ibid at paras 39, 66.
83. Ibid at para 38.
84. Cronin & Douglas, “Directed and Conditional”, supra note 56 at 287.
85. Doodeward, supra note 19 at 414.
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a more substantial transformative work, which makes it inapplicable 
to transplantable organs, whose utility lies in the preservation of their 
original state. 86 
In the same vein, Hardcastle observed that the work or skill exception 
is a conceptual derivation from the Roman law’s doctrine of specifi cation, 
which determines the proprietorship of a new object produced from 
a diff erent thing. 87 He opined that the “work or skill exception is a 
misguided application of the specifi cation doctrine because often the 
work performed is for preservation purposes and does not result in the 
creation of a new thing.”88 Moreover, the exception usually applies in 
favour of the provider of the work or skill (here, the transplant team), 
rather than the source or donor of the organ,89 although this could be 
remedied by considering the transplant team as having applied their skill 
to the organ as an agent of the donor.90
Apart from the potential justifi cation of a live donor’s proprietary 
entitlement based on the work or skill exception, it is possible to agree 
with Rose LJ’s inference, in R v Kelly, that a donor’s proprietary interest 
in his or her organ is created upon its detachment from the donor’s body 
with the intention of it being used for the purpose of transplantation.91 
Th is sort of intention-plus argument for the justifi cation of a property 
86. For this reason, the exception was not applied in Dobson v North Tyneside 
Health Authority, [1997] 1 WLR 596 (CA), where the deceased’s brain 
was merely fi xed in paraffi  n. Also, while the Court of Appeal, in Yearworth 
v North Bristol NHS Trust, [2009] EWCA Civ 37 [Yearworth], observed 
that the work or skill exception was potentially applicable to sperm 
samples of the claimants that were negligently preserved in a liquid 
nitrogen, it preferred to base the claimants’ proprietary interests on their 
right to control the use of their sperm samples extracted and stored for 
their benefi t. 
87. Rohan J Hardcastle, Law and the Human Body: Property Rights, 
Ownership, and Control (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 135-42.
88. Ibid at 142.
89. Brazier, supra note 33 at 563. 
90. Th is was the approach of the Australian case of In re Mark Edwards, 
[2011] NSWSC 478, involving proprietary interests in stored sperm 
samples.
91. R v Kelly, supra note 17; but this approach creates diffi  culties where the 
source has not stated any intention as to the use of the separated material. 
See Hardcastle, supra note 87 at 152-53.
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right was, again, used by the Court of Appeal in Yearworth when it held 
that the claimants, from whom negligently damaged sperm samples 
originated, had property rights in their sperm samples because the “sole 
object of the ejaculation of the sperm was that, in certain events, it might 
later be used for their benefi t.”92 More liberally, Penner93 and Hardcastle 
have suggested that a source’s (or donor’s) proprietary interest should 
become extant on the detachment of the body part, whether or not 
accompanied with an intention as to use, and that the separated body 
part should be considered the property of the source.94 
In addition, a sound justifi catory framework for the live donor’s 
ownership of an excised organ could be based on the principles of dignity 
and right to bodily integrity. Although these principles protect the person 
rather than their separated body parts, Hardcastle has observed that 
“[r]ecognising that property rights are created on detachment represents 
a natural extension of the right to bodily integrity”, and that “[i]t would 
seem inconsistent if the act of detachment changed biological materials 
from material fully protected by the law into material receiving no legal 
protection whatsoever.”95 Th is sort of dignitarian justifi catory framework 
resonates with Christman’s analysis of property as constituted, in part, by 
a collection of control rights which facilitate the holder’s psychological 
control over their environment and conduces to the development of 
their self-concept and promotion of their autonomy;96 something that 
Getzler categorises as an expressive theory of property.97 Th us, the live 
donor’s proprietary interest in an excised organ is reasonably justifi able. 
Additional support could also be inferred from some of the decided cases.
Moore v Regents of the University of California 98 is an interesting 
example. In this well-known case, Moore’s tissues were surreptitiously 
harvested by his physicians under the guise of a post-operative splenectomy 
92. Yearworth, supra note 86 at para 45.
93. JE Penner, Th e Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) at 111.
94. Hardcastle, supra note 87 at 145-50.
95. Ibid at 147.
96. Christman, “Distributive Justice”, supra note 43.
97. Getzler, supra note 52 at 641.
98. 271 Cal Rptr 146 (Sup Ct 1990) [Moore].
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procedure. Moore succeeded in his action for breach of informed consent, 
but the majority rejected his action for conversion. In his concurring and 
dissenting judgement, however, Justice Broussard observed that Moore’s 
“right to determine, prior to the removal of his body parts, how those 
parts would be used after removal” qualifi ed as a property right, which 
was infringed by the defendants and, thus, remediable in conversion.99 
To emphasize Moore’s proprietary entitlement to his excised body parts, 
Broussard J delineated a hypothetical scenario where “[i]f, for example, 
another medical center or drug company had stolen all of the cells in 
questions from the UCLA Medical Center laboratory and had used them 
for its own benefi t, there would be no question but that a cause of action 
for conversion would properly lie against the thief.”100 Th us, Broussard 
J thought that this hypothetical put Moore’s proprietary entitlement 
beyond doubt. 
Similarly, while Greenberg v Miami Children’s Hospital Research 
Institute 101 and Washington University v Catalona 102 both involved body 
parts donated for research, their propositions extrapolate to the organ 
donation context. In Greenberg, the claimants, parents of children 
suff ering from Canavan disease and charitable research foundations that 
support research on Canavan disease, provided tissues and body parts, 
as well as funding, to the defendant-scientists in order to facilitate the 
defendants’ research on Canavan disease. Th e research collaboration was 
fruitful, leading to the isolation and patenting of the Canavan gene, and 
the development of prenatal testing for the disease. However, the patent 
was obtained without the knowledge of the claimants, who alleged that 
the defendants’ licensing practice had the eff ect of defeating the claimants’ 
intention which was to make the prenatal testing generally available. In 
Catalona, Professor Catalona had assisted the Washington University 
in developing a biorepository, using tissues donated by his cancer 
patients and research participants, as well as tissues from the patients of 
his colleagues. However, Washington University objected to his claim 
99. Ibid at 168.
100. Ibid.
101. 264 F Supp (2d) 1064 (Fla D 2003) [Greenberg].
102. 437 F Supp (2d) 985 (Mo D 2006) [Catalona], aff ’d 490 F (3d) 667 (8th 
Cir 2007) [Catalona, 8th Cir].
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when he got a professional appointment at Northwestern University and 
sought to leave with some of the tissues in the biorepository, with the 
consent of the sources. 
While the claimants in both of these cases brought several causes 
of action, the concern here is on the courts’ treatment of the claimants’ 
conversion claims, touching on their proprietary entitlement to separated 
body parts. In dismissing the claimants’ causes of action in Greenberg 
(except for the action for unjust enrichment), Justice Moreno observed 
that “the property right in blood and tissue samples … evaporates once 
the sample is voluntarily given to a third party.”103 In the same vein, 
in Catalona, Justice Limbaugh “found the research participant to be a 
‘donor’ who had parted with any semblance of ownership rights once 
their biological materials had been excised for medical research.”104 Th e 
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affi  rmed the decision of 
Limbaugh J in Catalona, on the ground that the research participants 
had practically made a gift of their bodily tissues to the biorepository.105 
Th us, by anchoring the decisions in both cases on the legal concept of a 
gift, the courts implied that the claimants in Greenberg, and the research 
participants in Catalona, had proprietary interests in their excised body 
parts, at least initially, since you cannot make a gift unless it is yours to give 
in the fi rst place. 106 Th is suggests that a live donor possesses proprietary 
interest in their excised organ, which remains extant until validly 
transferred to a third party. Before considering the legal requirements 
for such a transfer, it is useful to look at two additional interesting cases.
In the Canadian case of Urbanski v Patel, 107 the claimant’s daughter 
had only one kidney due to congenital defect; however, the kidney was 
accidentally removed during an exploratory surgical procedure, due to 
the mistaken belief of the surgeon that the kidney was an ovarian cyst. To 
103. Greenberg, supra note 101 at 1075.
104. Catalona, supra note 102 at 997.
105. Catalona, 8th Circuit, supra note 102.
106. For a fuller discussion of the proprietary implications of both cases, see 
Remigius N Nwabueze, “Donated Organs, Property Rights and the 
Remedial Quagmire” (2008) 16:2 Med L Rev 201 at 218-21 [Nwabueze, 
“Remedial Quagmire”].
107. 84 DLR (3d) 650 (Man QB) [Urbanski].
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save his daughter who was left without any kidneys, the claimant donated 
one of his kidneys. Unfortunately, although the transplant operation was 
competently performed, it was not successful and the kidney had to be 
removed three days later. Th e claimant’s daughter succeeded in an action 
for negligence against the hospital for the loss of her only kidney. Th e 
claimant joined in the suit in his own right, alleging that the defendant’s 
negligence caused him to lose one of his kidneys. Justice Wilson agreed 
with the claimant and awarded damages on the ground that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s negligence which led to the 
loss of the claimant’s daughter’s kidney would cause the claimant to off er 
one of his kidneys to his daughter.108 
While Urbanski was entirely based in negligence rather than property 
law,109 it is suggested that the successful outcome, as well as the claimant’s 
standing to bring the action, was facilitated by the intuitive recognition 
of his proprietary interest in the excised kidney; an interest that was kept 
alive by the failed transplant, in the sense of preventing a complete transfer 
of the claimant’s separated kidney to his daughter. Sirianni v Anna 110 
renders this view more compelling. Sirianni’s facts closely mirror those 
of Urbanski. Just as in Urbanski, the claimant’s son in Sirianni had only 
one kidney due to congenital defects. Th at kidney was, unfortunately, 
mistakenly removed in a surgical procedure. Consequently, the claimant 
volunteered her kidney, which was successfully implanted in her son. Th e 
claimant then brought an action, alleging that the defendant’s negligence 
in treating her son caused her to lose one of her kidneys. Justice Ward 
held that the claimant had not stated a viable cause of action, and that 
her son’s (separate) action in negligence could not be extended to her, 
because her donation was a voluntary and independent act done with 
full knowledge of the consequences. Accordingly, Ward J observed that 
the “premeditated, knowledgeable and purposeful act of this plaintiff  in 
donating one of her kidneys to preserve the life of her son did not extend 
or reactivate the consummated negligence of these defendants.”111 
108. Ibid at paras 104-06.
109. Negligence was probably the only relevant cause of action in the 
circumstances.
110. 55 Misc (2d) 553 (NY Sup Ct 1967) [Sirianni].
111. Ibid at 556.
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Interestingly, in Urbanski, Wilson J distinguished Sirianni on the 
ground that it was decided in the 1960s, when transplantation procedure 
had not become routine and, therefore, could not be reasonably foreseeable 
in medical accidents involving the loss of a kidney.112 I suggest, however, 
that the outcome in Sirianni was dictated by the successful transplant 
operation in that case, on the basis of which ownership of the claimant’s 
excised organ had been completely transferred to her son. As the claimant 
no longer had an extant interest in her separated organ, it was diffi  cult for 
her to ground her case on any recognisable cause of action. Ward J may 
have had this in mind when he asked: “[s]tripped of emotionalism, the 
issue here is, does a cause of action exist in favour of a donor of a human 
organ against the defendants who removed vital organs from the donee 
in a negligent manner?”113 In essence, both Urbanski and Sirianni suggest 
that a live donor enjoys proprietary interest in an excised organ which has 
not yet been lodged in the body of a recipient.
D.  Eff ect of a Live Donor’s Gift
Th e analysis above suggests that the ownership of an excised organ vests 
in its source, the live donor. However, having made a gift of it, the critical 
question becomes when that gift could be said to have taken eff ect so as 
to exhaust or transfer the live donor’s proprietary interest to the donee. 
Recall that this question was also put forward in connection with the 
cadaveric donor, where I raised the issue of whether the eff ective moment 
of transfer was at the point of extraction, implantation or somewhere 
in-between. In essence, a live donor remains the owner of an orphaned 
organ until a valid transfer has taken place. Th is requires a legal analysis 
of gifts.
 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd 114 is a classic case on the validity of 
gifts. Th e claimant (the testator’s next of kin) challenged a bequest to 
the corporate defendant on the ground that its objects or purposes were 
subversive of Christianity, though not criminal, in the sense of being 
punishable under the common law of blasphemy. Th e claimant argued 
112. Urbanski, supra note 107 at paras 101-03.
113. Sirianni, supra note 110 at 554-55.
114. [1917] AC 406 (HL) [Bowman].
265(2015) 1 CJCCL
that with Christianity being part of the law of England, the defendant’s 
purposes amounted to a denial of or an attack on Christianity, which 
rendered the gift unenforceable for being contrary to public policy. 
However, with a gift approach that deemphasized the nature of 
the defendant’s purposes, Lord Parker expounded on the tripartite 
requirements as to the validity of gifts. First, there must be certainty 
as to the subject matter of the gift; second, the “donor must have the 
necessary disposing power over, and must employ the means recognized 
by common law as suffi  cient for the transfer of, the subject-matter;”115 
and third, the “donee must be capable of acquiring the subject-matter.”116 
When these conditions are satisfi ed, the “property in the subject-matter 
of the gift passes to the donee, and he becomes the absolute owner 
thereof and can deal with the same as he thinks fi t.”117 It should be added 
that while Lord Parker’s second condition above implies the presence 
of donative intention,118 the third condition implies the requirement 
of donee’s acceptance.119 In that sense, and in light of Hill’s very clear 
exposition on the topic, Bowman should be taken as evincing a two-sided 
analysis of gift, in contradistinction to an equally contending one-sided 
analysis of gifts, in which a gift is taken to be validly constituted by the 
unilateral act of the donor, subject to the donee’s right of repudiation.120 
A live donor’s gift of an excised organ potentially satisfi es Bowman’s 
conditions above. Th e only possible doubt relates to when the transfer (in 
condition two above) could be said to have been eff ectuated. Transfer of 
chattels by gift usually takes eff ect upon delivery. 121 If, analogically, an 
excised organ intended for transplantation was categorised as a chattel,122 
115. Ibid at 436.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Re Ridgway (1885), 15 QBD 447.
119. Jonathan Hill, ”Th e Role of the Donee’s Consent in the Law of Gift” 
(2001) 117 Law Q Rev 127.
120.  Ibid.
121. Duncan Sheehan, Th e Principles of Personal Property Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011) at 53.
122. Such a possibility looms large with the characterisation of an embryo 
as a chattel by an Alberta court in CC v AW, 2005 ABQB 290 (“[t]he 
remaining fertilized embryos remain her property. Th ey are chattels 
that can be used as she sees fi t”at para 25). However, the controversial 
266 
 
Nwabueze, Orphaned Transplantable Organs
the question becomes when the organ could be said to have been delivered. 
In the law of gifts, delivery is an analytically torturous concept.123 Th e 
clearest form of delivery is actual delivery, the physical or manual transfer 
of the object of the gift to the donee. Th is method of delivery is impossible 
in gifts of choses in action;124 parental gifts to young children;125 gifts of 
bulky objects;126 gifts of property in faraway places; gifts of a symbol 
of title (such as a key to a house);127 or gifts of objects already in the 
possession of the donee.128 Hence exceptions were made for symbolic 
or constructive delivery. 129 Two theories underpin the requirement of 
delivery. Th e fi rst trenches on the historical school of thought, which 
hypothesized that delivery was a relic of the historical requirement that 
the transfer of seisin in any property was not recognisable unless there 
was a change of possession.130 On the basis of this theory, delivery is not 
indispensable, and not a fundamental requirement of the law of gift, 
because it is a mere historical accident. However, Sheehan has affi  rmed 
the necessity for the requirement of delivery, observing that “English law 
has been reluctant to allow even the clearest words of gift to override the 
need for an unequivocal change of possession.”131 On the other hand, 
nature of such characterisations is put into bold relief by Justice Arabian’s 
concurring judgement in Moore, supra note 98  (“[p]laintiff  has asked us 
to recognize and enforce a right to sell one’s own body tissue for profi t. 
He entreats us to regard the human vessel – the single most venerated 
and protected subject in any civilized society – as equal with the basest 
commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the 
profane. He asks much” at 164).
123. Some dated, but historically relevant, analyses of the subject include: 
Frederick W Maitland, “Th e Mystery of Seisin” (1886) 2 Law Q Rev 481; 
Frederick Pollock, “Gifts of Chattels Without Delivery” (1890) 6 Law Q 
Rev 446; Samuel Stoljar, “Th e Delivery of Chattels” (1958) 21 Mod L 
Rev 27.
124. Milroy v Lord (1862), 4 De GF & J 264 (CA in Ch).
125. Jones v Lock (1865), 1 Ch App 25.
126. In Re Cole, [1964] Ch 175 (CA).
127. Wrightson v McArthur and Hutchinson, [1921] 2 KB 807.
128. In Re Stoneham, [1919] 1 Ch 149.
129. Sheehan, supra note 121 at 54-55. See also Patrick Rohan, “Th e 
Continuing Question of Delivery in the Law of Gifts” (1962) 38:1 Ind LJ 
1 at 7-8 [Rohan, “Delivery in the Law of Gifts”].
130. Rohan, “Delivery in the Law of Gifts”, ibid at 4.
131. Sheehan, supra note 121 at 55.
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the second theory of delivery emphasizes its functionality, rather than 
the manual tradition; this includes the need to protect a donor against 
the enforcement of rash or impulsive promises of gift, the evidentiary 
advantage of having witnesses of the gift, and the prevention of fraud.132 
Th us, delivery should be adjudged to have taken place whenever these 
functions are satisfi ed, whether or not accompanied by a physical transfer 
of the gift. In practice, however, the cases on gifts do not fi t neatly into 
any of the two theories above, hence the courts’ approaches have been 
rather eclectic.133 
All of the above means that the delivery of an excised organ could 
be actual or symbolic. However, actual delivery by the live donor is not 
practically possible since the organ has to be extracted after the live donor 
had been physically immobilised by the administration of anaesthetic 
agents. Also, the excised organ is usually taken into the immediate 
possession of the transplant team for lodgement in the recipient. While 
this diffi  culty could be met by construing the transplant team as agents 
of the live donor for the purpose of actual delivery, it is more plausible to 
hold that delivery in the transplantation context is eff ected symbolically. 
Th us, the intention to donate, coupled with extraction of the organ, 
should be regarded as eff ecting the delivery of a live donor’s excised organ 
to the recipient.134 In essence, the recipient of a live donation becomes 
(thanks to Lord Parker in Bowman above) the “absolute owner”135 
of a donated organ from the moment the organ is extracted from the 
donor.136 Consequently, it is the designated recipient of an excised organ 
that should exercise legal rights in relation to the organ. 
Before examining the recipient’s proprietary interest in detail, it 
remains to put aside the often unstated assumption that any property 
132. Rohan, “Delivery in the Law of Gifts”, supra note 129 at 4-6.
133. Ibid.
134. Th is is consistent with Rohan’s suggestion that delivery should be taken to 
be complete where an overt act accompanies the expression of a donative 
intent. Ibid at 18.
135. Bowman, supra note 114 at 436, 440.
136. Pattinson makes a suggestion to the contrary, observing that the transfer 
of proprietary interests to the recipient takes place only after implantation 
of the organ in the recipient. However, Pattinson did not discuss the law 
of gifts. Pattinson, supra note 56 at 407. 
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right in an excised organ vests in the state and, thus, the state is entitled 
to distribute donated organs on the grounds of effi  ciency and justice.
III. State Ownership or Entitlement to Donated   
 Organs
Although not given much dialogue, it is often assumed that altruistically 
donated cadaveric organs belong to the state – local, provincial, regional, 
or national government (as the case may be); thus, such organs constitute 
a national resource, a sort of community property. Quite often, this sort 
of argument is used to justify the state’s exclusive control over organ 
donation and allocation criteria. For instance, Prottas observed that both 
the federal and state governments in the US became increasingly involved 
in the organ transplantation process because of the belief that the “organs 
were not the property of the physician procuring them but of the public 
at large.”137 For the same reason, Zink and colleagues argued that the 
“only body that is qualifi ed to determine who will receive donated organs 
in a fair and ethical manner is the medical community.”138 In the same 
way, Nelson suggested that “we ought to move closer toward seeing such 
organs as communal resources.”139 
While this presumption of state ownership is generally common 
and strong, its provenance is not entirely clear. Cronin and Price have 
suggested that the idea of state ownership of donated organs might be 
based on the questionable no-property rule for cadavers, in the sense 
that parts of cadavers suitable for transplants might be taken into the 
possession and ownership of professionals as fi rst possessors, on behalf of 
society. Th e authors, however, concluded that the “[n]otions of collective 
property in body parts are anathema to most liberal societies.”140 Th e 
issue was much more seriously debated in the US, especially in the mid-
2000s; the immediate context of the debate was the proprietary status 
of UNOS (United Network of Organ Sharing) in relation to donated 
137. Jeff rey Prottas, Th e Most Useful Gift: Altruism and the Public Policy of 
Organ Transplants (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994) at 18.
138. Sheldon Zink et al, “Examining the Potential Exploitation of UNOS 
Policies” (2005) 5:4 American Journal of Bioethics 6 at10.
139. Nelson, supra note 13 at 27.
140. Cronin & Price, supra note 15 at 129.
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cadaveric organs. Particularly, the debate was focused on whether UNOS 
could override a donor’s wishes regarding the designation or direction 
of their organ.141 Truog rightly observed that the debate hinged on the 
“question of whether transplantable organs should be considered personal 
property or a societal resource.”142 Truog argued that legal distinctions 
are commonly made between the living and the dead, and that such 
diff erentiations sometimes justify the invasion of the body of the dead 
for public purposes (such as forensic autopsy), although such invasions 
are not permissible in the case of a living person. For that reason, Truog 
opined that “organs obtained from cadaveric donors should be regarded 
as a societal resource;”143 as such, only a limited direction of the donor 
should be allowed. In the same vein, Childress argued that cadaveric 
organs are a national or community resource and, thus, they should 
be allocated based on effi  ciency and utilitarian considerations, rather 
than extraneous factors, such as the accident of geography.144 Cohen, 
however, disagreed on the conceptualisation of cadaveric organs as a 
public resource;145 he observed that donated “cadavaric organs do not 
belong to UNOS. UNOS is given custody and control of organs.”146 
Th us, he suggested that UNOS is a trustee that should remain faithful to 
its responsibilities by respecting the conditions placed on donated organs 
by the donors. In part, the weakness of the argument for state ownership 
of donated organs is the incontrovertible fact that property in the organ, 
as shown above, is vested in the donor, at least initially. Th e burden, 
therefore, is on the proponents of state ownership to show how the organ 
has suddenly transmogrifi ed to state ownership.
Furthermore, an altruistically donated organ is usually meant for the 
benefi t of a potential recipient on the waiting list, rather than as a gift 
to the state. In that sense, the organ might be considered as the property 
141. Note that the US Uniform Anatomical Gift Act permits the designation of 
recipients of cadaveric organs.
142. Robert D Truog, “Are Organs Personal Property or a Societal Resource?” 
(2005) 5:4 American Journal of Bioethics 14 at 14.
143. Ibid at 15.
144. Childress, supra note 12.
145. Lloyd R Cohen, “UNOS: Th e Faithless Trustee” (2005) 5:4 American 
Journal of Bioethics 13.
146. Ibid at 13.
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of a potential recipient on the waiting list, subject to the state’s power to 
select the actual recipient according to the established allocation criteria. 
Consequently, the state is neither an owner nor a trustee of donated 
organs, but a donee of power. Describing the state as a trustee would 
inadvertently recognise it as the legal owner of an organ, albeit without 
benefi cial content. As a donee of power, however, the state is empowered 
to select a recipient in order to complete the transfer to that recipient; 
before the state exercises its power of selection, the right of action in 
relation to the organ belongs to the donor. Since the state is, however, 
in physical possession of the organ before implantation in the recipient, 
it might wish to vindicate such possessory interests in the event of an 
unauthorised interference. Th is approach resonates with the observation 
of the Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics that an excised organ intended for 
transplantation should be “conceptualised as being in the ‘custodianship’ 
of third parties,” which should include “rights of possession and use, but 
only for the purposes envisaged in the original consent.”147 Th us, the 
Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics implies that the state has custody and 
possession, but not ownership of donated organs.
IV.  Entitlement of the Recipient
As analysed above, the delivery of an excised organ has the eff ect of vesting 
the proprietary interest in the recipient. Th us, the potential recipient, 
rather than the donor, is the appropriate person to seek legal remedies for 
any unlawful or unauthorised interference with an excised organ. Th is 
conclusion engages the interesting case of Colavito v New York Organ 
Donor Network, 148 which is more fully discussed elsewhere.149 
In Colavito, the deceased’s wife made a directed donation of her 
late husband’s kidneys to Colavito, a long-time family friend who was 
suff ering from end stage renal disease. Th e kidneys were retrieved from 
the deceased in a New York hospital, and were intended to be air-lifted 
147. Nuffi  eld Council on Bioethics, supra note 2 at para 7.21.
148. 356 F Supp (2d) 237 (NY D 2005) [Colavito], aff ’d 438 F (3d) 214 (2d 
Cir 2006) [Colavito, 2d Cir 2006]; Colavito v New York Organ Donor 
Network, 8 NY (3d) 43 (NY Ct App 2006) [Calavito, Ct App], aff ’d 486 F 
(3d) 78 (2d Cir 2007) [Colavito, 2d Cir 2007].
149. Nwabueze, “Remedial Quagmire” supra note 106 at 209-16.
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to Miami, Florida, for lodgement in Colavito. Under the relevant New 
York statute, however, Colavito was only entitled to one kidney at a time, 
so only the left kidney was taken to him. Minutes before the transplant 
surgery, Colavito’s doctor discovered that the left kidney was irreparably 
damaged; he therefore made an immediate request for the right kidney 
from the New York hospital, but was told that the right kidney had 
already been allocated to another patient whose transplant operation was 
then in progress. Eventually, histo-compatibility test results showed that 
the kidneys were histo-incompatible with Colavito’s anti-bodies; thus, 
the transplant could not have taken place in any event. Nevertheless, 
Colavito sued for conversion, fraud and breach of statutory duties, 
though the conversion claim is the most relevant here. Th e District Court 
dismissed Colavito’s conversion claim on the ground that there was no 
property right in the dead body of a human being or parts of it. 
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, observed that 
the cases supporting the no-property rule in the human body were utterly 
anachronistic, and that those cases could not anticipate the modern 
revolution in biomedical technology and its application to body parts. 
Moreover, the Second Circuit observed that those earlier cases were mainly 
concerned about claimants whose only injury sounded in emotional 
distress, in contradistinction to Colavito, who suff ered a real deprivation 
through the loss of an organ. Th us, the Second Circuit certifi ed certain 
questions to the New York Court of Appeals, which returned a negative 
answer, observing that under the New York organ donation statute “it is 
enough to say … that plaintiff , as a specifi ed donee of an incompatible 
kidney, has no common-law right to the organ.”150 When the matter 
came back again to the Second Circuit, it agreed with the New York 
Court of Appeals, adding that “as a matter of law … Colavito could not 
have derived a medical benefi t from the organ and did not ‘need’ it.”151 
More importantly, Colavito’s case demonstrates an implicit 
acceptance by the courts adjudicating the matter that Colavito, as the 
specifi ed recipient of an excised kidney, was the owner thereof and, thus, 
was competent to bring the claim for conversion. Unsurprisingly, the 
150. Colavito, Ct App, supra note 148 at 53.
151. Colavito, 2d Cir 2007, supra note 148 at 81.
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District Court described the donated kidneys as “Mr Colavito’s kidneys,” 
although it confusingly added that they “are not property.”152 Similarly, 
Justice Sack of the US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, observed that 
while Colavito’s right of action could be supported under the relevant 
New York statute on organ donation, his proprietary interests in the 
kidney could be grounded in his common law rights by analogy to 
the benefi ciary of a trust of the benefi t of a covenant, a concept that 
does not rely on the doctrine of consideration or privity of contract.153 
Furthermore, Colavito provides support for the view that the delivery of 
a donated organ takes place at the point where the organ is excised with 
the intention of transplanting it to a specifi ed recipient.
V.  Conclusion
Considerable legal liability issues may arise in connection with an 
excised organ in the period between its extraction from the donor and 
implantation in the recipient. Where the organ is stolen, damaged, 
maliciously destroyed, or used without authority, one of the questions 
that would arise is that of ownership; in other words, whose organ is it 
and who can sue for the damage or unlawful interference with it?  
What has been done above is to provide a tiered analysis of the 
ownership of orphaned organs and its justifi catory underpinnings. Th e 
issue is one that is bound to increase in importance in light of both the 
general shortage of transplantable organs and further improvements in 
transplantation technology. Accordingly, it is suggested that after delivery 
the proprietary interests in an excised organ vests in the designated or 
selected recipient. Delivery takes place after the organ has been excised 
with the intention of lodging it in the body of a designated or specifi ed 
recipient. Th us, the recipient is empowered to sue for any interference 
with an orphaned organ. Before delivery, however, the donor remains 
the owner, and should be able to exercise his or her ownership rights or 
control over the organ. Furthermore, the state is neither the owner nor 
trustee of donated organs, but, as a custodian thereof, the state might wish 
152. Colavito, supra note 148 at 244.
153. Colavito, 2d Cir 2006, supra note 148 at 228. For enunciation of the 
principle, see Fletcher v Fletcher (1864), 67 ER 564 (Ch).
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to vindicate its possessory interests. In this way, the current proprietary 
gaps surrounding an excised organ are closed, and its orphaned status is 
eliminated.  
